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Abstract 
The Agency Theory has been an important topic regarding corporate governance of 
organizations, as it addresses potential conflicts between shareholders and managers, 
constituting the target of many researches in for-profit organizations. However, regarding 
Not-for-Profit Organizations (NPO) the information is proportionally smaller and rather 
scarce.  
The use of the Stakeholder Theory in this dissertation, even if not necessarily required to 
explain principal-agent relations, it is desirable given that NPO lack a principal in the 
sense of the for-profit context. Consequently, the theory proposes the stakeholders as the 
principal in that relations given that they have an important claim on NPO daily 
operations. 
In the light of a competing debate between Agency Theory and Stakeholder Theory, the 
objective of this study is to analyze whose factors influence the retention of excess 
endowment in Portuguese NPO, how those generate or not agency problems and the 
importance of stakeholders for that matter.  
The realization of a benchmark regression allowed to find whose financial indicators 
affected mainly the behavior of endowment holdings (defined as cash, bank deposits and 
liquid financial investments) in Portuguese NPO. For excess endowment, the results did 
not favor significantly agency problems principally in the case of board remuneration and 
in grants receiving. Excess endowment is favored for investment on fixed assets. 
Results of the regression did not support any empirical evidence of agency problems. 
Still, further studies can give a more complete overview on this topic. The intention of 
this study it is then to fill some gaps on the literature of Agency Theory over NPO. 
Key-words: Agency Theory; Stakeholder Theory; Not-for-Profit; Corporate 
Governance; Endowment 
JEL-Codes: G31; G35; G38; J33; L31 
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Resumo 
A Teoria da Agência tem sido importante no que diz respeito a gestão das organizações, 
sobretudo porque aborda potenciais conflitos entre acionistas e gestores, sendo alvo de 
muitos estudos em organizações com fins lucrativos. No entanto, o tema em organizações 
sem fins lucrativos é proporcionalmente pequeno e a sua informação bastante dispersa.  
O uso da Teoria dos Stakeholders nesta dissertação, ainda que não necessária para 
explicar relações entre principal e agente, é desejável dado que as organizações sem fins 
lucrativos não têm um principal no sentido das organizações com fins lucrativos. 
Consequentemente, a teoria propõe os stakeholders como os principais nessas relações 
dado que eles têm de facto importância nas operações das organizações sem fins 
lucrativos. 
Usando como base um debate entre a Teoria da Agência e a Teoria dos Stakeholders, o 
objetivo deste estudo é de analisar que fatores influenciam a retenção de grandes 
“endowments” em organizações do terceiro sector, que problemas de agência isso pode 
ou não acarretar e de que forma os stakeholders importam nessas relações.  
A realização de uma regressão “benchmark” permitiu encontrar quais indicadores 
financeiros afetam principalmente o comportamento de retenção de “endowment” em 
organizações sem fins lucrativos portugueses. Para “endowment excessivo”, os resultados 
não favorecem significativamente problemas de agência no caso de remuneração dos 
quadros sociais e do recebimento de donativos. Já investimento em ativos fixos é 
explicado por retenção de endowment excessivo. 
Os resultados neste estudo não mostram qualquer tipo de evidência empírica de 
problemas de agência. No entanto, mais estudos permitirão dar uma análise mais 
completa deste tópico. A intenção deste estudo foi a de preencher algumas lacunas 
existentes em relação a esta temática. 
Palavras-chave: Teoria da Agência; Teoria dos Stakeholders; Sem-fins Lucrativos; 
Gestão Organizacional; Endowment 
Códigos-JEL: G31; G35; G38; J33; L31 
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Introduction 
 
Not-for-Profit Organizations (NPO) are typically different from for-profit organizations. 
One obvious difference it is their distribution of profit. NPO face the constraint of not 
being able to distribute their profit to their owners because there are no owners (in the 
case of for-profit the shareholders) and their main end is social profit.1 In fact, it brings a 
problem of applicability of Agency Theory onto NPO. For the study of the manager 
behavior, the principal is not properly defined, if the classical theory is followed. In this 
study, it will be used propositions of both Agency Theory and the Stakeholder Theory. 
Alike any regular organization, NPO maintain important relations with their stakeholders 
because they are the ones that make it possible the existence of the activities of the 
organization. (Simsa and Patak, 2008 in Eller, 2004) The stakeholders can be various, 
through simple donors to the everyday workers, they are the ones who contribute, so they 
have interest part that the funds of the NPO are well spent. 
In the sense of monitoring these relations, individual or collective stakeholders may well 
face some problems when they contribute with grants or donations for the NPO to carry 
out their social objectives (Fisman and Hubbard, 2005). 
For these NPO-Stakeholders relations it can be applicable a principal-agent relation, even 
if the classical theory propositions do not fit or describe them, due to a proper lacking 
definition of the principal or agent as suggested in Agency Theory, a hybrid between 
Agency plus Stakeholder Theory can explain the relation between NPO and their 
respective Stakeholders (Puyvelde, V. et al, 2012). 
The endowment is an important instrument when NPO struggles with a decline on cash 
inflows and has the need to secure some funds to pursue and continue their operations 
(Fisman and Hubbard, 2003). The hold of endowment may well serve purposes other than 
financing regular activities, like remunerating the executive board as well allow 
investment in fixed assets. The few studies on this matter use endowment or cash holdings 
                                                          
1 “The Non-Distribution Constraint states that a nonprofit organization is prohibited from distributing its 
net earnings among individuals who oversee the organization. This includes board members, staff and 
directors” http://www.learningtogive.org/resources/non-distribution-constraint. 
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(depending on the level of asset liquidity) as a source of potential conflict between 
managers and stakeholders. For this study, endowment will be the main variable. 
This research is then oriented to look for evidence of agency problems over Portuguese 
NPO. The objective is to search and compute financial indicators inside NPO that are 
normally associated to Agency Theory in the literature, any signs of self-interest conduct 
by the agent in managing the organization’s endowment and how stakeholders’ relations 
are privileged. The question intended to answer is: 
Do managers hold excess endowments as a consequence of agency costs in 
Portuguese NPO? 
Answering it, will provide evidence of any similarities between for-profit organizations 
and NPO regarding principally supervision and control roles inside the boards of the 
organizations. Also, it will show what matters to donators by the time they make their 
donations to Portuguese NPO. For this specific topic, is what is privileged for any relation 
between NPO and any grant-maker (donors and other similar entities). 
The application of the Stakeholder Theory and Agency Theory onto NPO for the 
development of this dissertation was motivated by the fact that I did a curricular internship 
in a Portuguese NPO called A3S (Associação A3S)2. The organization has the objective 
of “(…) research and development (R&D) with the mission of promoting social 
entrepreneurship for collective knowledge, for the sustainability of the third sector and to 
contribute to the consolidation of sustainable development alternatives, more just, 
equitable and participatory (…)”. 
My stay over A3S allowed me to improve not only my soft skills but also test my technical 
knowledge from what I have learned in my past years both in my master’s degree but also 
in my bachelor’s. The reality of a NPO is very different from the others I studied in for-
profit context. Although there are many similar parameters when running both type of 
organizations, they are important changes significantly in how they are managed. The 
non-distribution constraint (Fisman and Hubbard, 2003) can be a starting point to better 
comprehend what really matters from a NPO side. Like mentioned before, the lack of a 
                                                          
2 http://a-3s.org/ 
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shareholder, guides the attention for these organizations for all relevant stakeholders not 
only for the specific main end of each one of them but also for those who support the 
organization every day. With this, my knowledge over 3rd sector organizations grew, not 
only of their structure but also the way they act. 
During my internship on the organization and in the process of doing my tasks, I was 
recurrently in contact with various financial documents not only of A3S but other 
documents in a matter of being linked to the tasks done during the internship and also by 
curiosity of my professional area. By accounting standards, NPO regulations are equal to 
those of the for-profit organizations. More, the reports are in its majority like those shown 
by them. Nevertheless, although the financial indicators are the same, in its essence they 
are different. First, NPO have the status of being tax-exempt.  Second, a NPO do not seek 
to maximize economic profit but social profit. It does not mean that they do not seek that 
profit but when doing a proper analysis of the NPO, qualitative measures are heavily 
weighted. 
This dissertation has the then intention of, by answering the research question, finding 
more similarities and/or differences between these two types of organizations. Being 
structurally different, the research may also allow to promote better practices of corporate 
governance and ways of increasing organization value of those commonly known. 
The sample is of Portuguese NPO with consistent financial reports for the period of 2011-
2015 (balance and income sheet required). Study follows the methodology used in the 
studies like Core et al. (2006) or Ramirez. A (2010) that consisted in running a benchmark 
regression, where it was expected two results: 
-main variables that contribute to the value of endowment or cash; 
-the NPO with higher endowment to the mean of the sample and consequently the 
residuals for a second regression. 
In the second point, we were able to identify if the agency variables are or are not relevant 
to the definition of the excess endowment as well the main drivers relevant for donors at 
the time of making their grants. 
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Past this section, this dissertation is divided as follows: the section 2 referring to the 
literature review with subtopics related to the main concepts, main theories, similar 
studies and a critical opinion over them; section 3 is for empirical analysis, like data and 
steps of the research, methodology and interpretation of results; finally, a conclusion over 
the results, limitations and further researches suggestions. 
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Chapter 1. Literature Review 
 
The literature review on this study covers the main theories underlying the subject as well 
a summary over other ones regarding corporate governance. Also, it is presented a model 
that explains reasons for endowment retention. In the end of the chapter, a theoretical 
framework of the research question and a critical review on main literature is shown. 
 
1.1 Main Theories 
 
1.1.1 Agency Theory 
 
In the Agency Theory literature, the notions of principal and agent are the first ones to be 
defined. The first ones are the represented, the principals, and the second ones are those 
who represent, the agents. Generally, these are well stated in the for-profit area. The 
principals are normally the shareholders of a corporation and the agents are the managers 
of it (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The theory assumes that those two groups have 
different utility functions and different attitudes towards risk, considering the principal as 
risk neutral and the agent as risk averse, so their interests towards their company are 
consequently misaligned (Fama, 1981). There are two problems that are normally 
associated with managers: adverse selection, when managers hide from the shareholders 
important information regarding their personal traits and ambition; moral hazard, here the 
agents act in self-interest and with opportunistic behavior. The theory suggests 
mechanisms of monitoring or incentive that can be taken by the two parties, usually 
known as bonding costs, to mitigate or even avoid the potential conflict between those 
two groups (Eisenhardt, 1989). For-profit are structurally formed to have a board of 
directors which function is to monitor and ratify the decisions made by the managers to 
ensure the interests of common shareholders. One more relevant definition will be agency 
costs that represent the sum of the principal monitoring expenditures, the agent’s bonding 
expenditures and any remaining residual loss firm (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen, 
1983). 
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Before beginning the description of the Stakeholder Theory, some points regarding the 
differences between for-profit organizations and NPO should be made clear. The 
shareholder is the top of the hierarchy model in a for profit corporation, consequently as 
the final decision maker and controller (Lan, 2010 in Eller, 2014). This theory is then 
inefficient when transposable to the NPO context, since there is no identifiable owner. 
More, the non-distribution constraint premise denies the identification of residual 
claimers to NPO profits (Hansmann, 2010). The final decisions are attributable then to 
other stakeholders depending of the NPO analyzed (Miller, 2002). 
1.1.2. Stakeholder Theory 
 
For a proper framework of this study, given that NPO lacks shareholders, it was included 
the assumptions of the Stakeholder Theory. The Stakeholder Theory differs from the 
Agency Theory in two perspectives: it does not restrict the group of principals to only 
shareholders and says that the market is inefficient contrary to the position of market 
efficiency of the principal-agent theory (Hill and Jones, 1992). With this, the notion of 
principal must be bigger than previously defined on the theory of agency. For the 
development of this work, principal will be all relevant stakeholders, internal or external, 
as defined next: the term stakeholders refer to groups of constituents who have a 
legitimacy claim on the firm (Freeman, 1984; Pearce, 1982 in Hill and Jones, 1992).  
The use of this theory follows the arguments presented in Van Puyvelde et al.,2012. In 
this paper, they attribute the various relations between NPO and stakeholder (either 
internal or external) as similar to principal-agent relationships. Regarding this 
dissertation, this argument is applicable to validate the use of the Excess Endowment as 
the dependent variable in the regressions as well indirectly the relations between donors 
and managers are assessed in principal-agent relations. 
Mitchell et al. (1997) defined a typology for stakeholders depending on its power, 
legitimacy and urgency. They state that managers should be aware of all stakeholders but 
those who have at least two of these three attributes should be a priority for managers. 
Jensen (2002) argues that Stakeholder Theory is incomplete as it does not specify a 
corporate purpose of its objective function. As there are multiple constituents for the 
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managers to attend to, it becomes tougher and harder to do a proper trade-off between 
them. Jensen proposes a more complete theory denominated Enlightened Stakeholder 
Theory. This is suggested as giving a purpose for which organizations should guide their 
relations with stakeholders. The objective is simple: ensure long-term firm value 
maximization by giving all personnel the necessary structure in how they manage and 
attend all important constituents of the firm. 
1.2. Other Theories 
 
The theories that address the principal-agent relationship follow different assumptions 
regarding both parties’ natural behavior. Some authors in the literature assume that the 
theories are independent from each other, so a counter argument against Agency Theory, 
others see the remaining theories as complement of the theory of agency. Still, depending 
on the problem analyzed we may choose one of the theories to explain the behavior of 
both groups of actors. Table (1) show a summary on the relevant aspects of each theory: 
aim, assumptions about human beings, problem analyzed and respective authors. The 
information displayed in table (1) was an adaptation of the document by Cuevas-
Rodriguez G. et al. (2012) and presents the relevant theories in the literature. 
1.2.1. Stewardship Theory 
 
The Stewardship Theory is prominent in the NPO literature. This theory prepositions 
assumes that agent looks for the best interest of its principal, so it is motivated to 
maximize the utility of its principal rather than a self-interest behavior (Donaldson and 
Davis, 1991).  
Sundaramurthy and Lewis (2003) present an interesting distinction between Agency 
Theory and Stewardship Theory in various contexts. Firms’ inside and external relations 
and their environment are dynamic, so the authors analyses corporate’s performance over 
different frameworks of the mentioned conditions. Organization’s identification, level of 
risk, cooperation or conflict can change the relation between principal and agent, 
modifying the strategy applied and its successfulness.  
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Donaldson and Davis (1991) present an empirical analysis over the benefits of CEO 
duality3. The ROE observed by the firms with CEO duality was higher than those with 
independent role of the CEO from the chairman of the board. This evidence supports 
Stewardship Theory and not Agency Theory, given that the latter favor the separation of 
the roles.  
Arthurs and Busenitz (2003) studies the relation between Venture Capitalist and 
Entrepreneur appointing the limitations of both Agency Theory and Stewardship Theory. 
Goal congruence, development of trust and stock ownership are in the center of analysis. 
Neither theory could fully explain VC-E relationship. 
1.2.2. Resource Dependence Theory 
 
This theory was brought by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) in their book “The External 
Control of Organizations: A Resource Dependence Perspective”. The theory approach is 
based on the necessity of the organizations to engage and rely in relations with their 
surrounding environment. The ability to change itself and the environment is required to 
fulfill the organizations objectives.  
Hillmann et al. (2009) did a review over the book. There are five points on how 
organizations can reduce environment dependence: through mergers and acquisitions; 
joint ventures and similar; board of directors; political action; executive succession.  
Daily and Dalton (1994) reinforces the value of outside directors in times of 
environmental pressure. Looming bankruptcy can be mitigated by the presence of outside 
directors in the board that can assure valuable information and other resources, resources 
that couldn’t be achieved by other means. 
1.2.3. Institutional Theory 
 
Institutional Theory proposal says that organizations are industry oriented, ruled by its 
norms and beliefs. 
                                                          
3 As presented by the same authors, CEO duality is defined as the incumbency of roles of both CEO and 
chairman of the board. This way, CEO exerts direction but also command and control in the organization. 
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Eisenhardt (1988) uses it as framework to explain compensation policies in organizations. 
Slatten et al. (2011), in the light of Institutional Theory offer some theoretical insight 
where NPO should get accreditation, with the purpose of gaining legitimacy and diminish 
information asymmetry gap from donators. 
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Table 1. Main theories regarding corporate governance 
Theories Aim Assumptions about 
human beings 
Problem Analyzed Authors 
Agency 
Theory 
Maximization of 
organizational 
efficiency 
Individuals are rational 
beings with selfish 
opportunist behavior 
and with concrete 
preferences toward risk 
(neutrality to risk 
[(principal)] or 
aversion [(agent)] 
Relationship between 
principal and agent as 
well as mechanisms 
(internal/external) that 
allow for control of 
agent performance 
Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) 
Fama (1981) 
Eisenhardt 
(1989) 
Stakeholder 
Theory 
Balancing interest 
of different groups 
(stakeholders) 
Individual’s attitudes 
are not always selfish 
and relationships 
between individuals are 
interdependent (have 
repercussions that are 
themselves influenced 
by other relationships 
in turn) 
How executive decision 
making considers the 
interests of different 
stakeholders involved in 
the organization 
Dixit (1997) 
Hill and Jones 
(1992) 
Stewardship 
Theory 
Maximization of 
shareholder wealth 
via the 
maximization of 
the administrator’s 
utility 
Administrator’s 
behavior is altruistic 
and collaborative (the 
individual identifies 
with organizational 
mission and objectives) 
Situations in which 
executives like 
administrators are 
motivated to act in the 
best interest of their 
principals 
Donaldson and 
Davis (1991) 
Arthurs and 
Busenitz (2003) 
Sundaramurthy 
and Lewis (2003) 
Resource 
Dependence 
Theory 
Maximize the 
resources provided 
by the board 
Individual are 
heterogeneous and each 
one can allocate 
specific resources. 
Boards as providers of 
resources for the 
survival of the 
organization 
Daily and Dalton 
(1994) 
Hillman et al. 
(2009) 
 
Institutional 
Theory 
Legitimation of the 
organization in 
social context 
Individual adapts to the 
system of norms, 
values and beliefs 
within institutional 
environment 
Organizational practices Eisenhardt 
(1988) 
Slatten et al. 
(2011) 
Wiseman et al. 
(2012) 
Adapted from Cuevas-Rodriguez, G., et al. (2012). "Has Agency Theory Run its Course?” Making the Theory 
more Flexible to Inform the Management of Reward Systems." Corporate Governance-an International Review 
20(6): 526-546. 
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1.3. NPO vs For-profit organizations 
 
Differences between for-profit organizations and NPO are significant (table 2). As 
observable in this dissertation, NPO can assume various legal forms, depending on the 
organizational structure desired by the founders. For-profit organizations are generally 
divided into public or private companies and, furtherly, small, medium or big sized 
depending on the assets held. NPO by their side, can be associations, foundations, and 
others. 
In terms of ownership, generally these terms are well defined in the context of for-profit 
organizations. About this matter the topics property rights, organization’s stakeholders 
and shareholders’ interests and distribution of earnings on table (2) are usually connected. 
Normally, the shareholder is a generalized name for the owner of a for-profit firm. 
Consequently, this position entitles the shareholders as residual claimers for the 
organization profits, as well, all operations made in the corporation should be in their best 
interest. NPO position is very much different. There are no owners, so there are not any 
residual claimers to the organization’s profits, and so in the light of the Stakeholder 
Theory, the organization will act in all relevant stakeholders’ best interests (Eller, 2014). 
 Performance is all about financial indicators in for-profit. Whether if we have a profit or 
a loss, these will reflect into operational efficiency plus market acceptance. (Malik, 2007, 
in Eller, 2014). Like mentioned previously, NPO are Stakeholder oriented so their finality 
is more towards a social profit. Financial efficiency, of course, matters but the 
expectations of the Stakeholders are the core mission of a NPO, how they are 
accomplished is usually the important measure of a NPO performance. Structurally for-
profit can be two-tier or one tier and NPO one tier. One tier governance model is like that 
shown in figure 1, inside and outside directors are usually one, being the inside directors 
responsible for government roles and outside directors responsible of supervision roles 
(Choi, 2011). The two-tier model is essentially different in the separation of inside board 
of directors and external board of directors like show in figure 2. Both models are 
hierarchical top-down, like described in the Agency Theory (Eller, 2014). 
Finally, for-profit personnel are by nature remunerated for executing their jobs. NPO have 
also remunerated jobs, but is usually a mix of paid jobs and volunteering jobs.   
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Table 2. Features comparison NPO vs for profit (Eller, 2014) 
Figure 1. One-tier governance model (Choi, 2011) 
Figure 2. Two-tier governance model (Choi, 2011) 
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1.4. Reasons for Endowment Holdings  
 
The precautionary savings is a way to internalize the need to smooth expenditure today 
in order to be safe from future income uncertainty. Fisman and Hubbard (2004) adjust 
this problem to the the fact that donors may want that their funds should be spent away 
rather that being in form of savings (in this case in form of endowment). They suggest a 
simple model to describe the NPO entrepreneur problem: 
max
𝑄1𝑄2
𝑈(𝑄1) + 1/2[𝑈(𝑄2𝐿) + 𝑈(𝑄2𝐻))]                                   (1.1) 
Where, 
𝑄2𝑖 = 𝐷1 − 𝑄1 + 𝐷2𝑖 = 𝐹 + 𝐷2𝑖 , 𝑖 = 𝐿, 𝐻                                (1.2) 
𝑄1 ≤ 𝐷1                                                              (1.3) 
𝑈′(𝑄1) = 1/2[𝑈
′(𝑄2𝐿) + 𝑈
′(𝑄2𝐻)] + 𝜇1                                  (1.4) 
Equation (1.1) represents the maximization of utility by the manager, where U’>0 and 
U’’<0.  
The manager of the NPO derives utility from producing the charitable good. The problem 
is presented, like shown in Equation (1.2),  as the need of the manager to obtain financing 
in the order to produce the output of the good in period 1 (𝑄1) and in period 2 (𝑄2). With 
attention for the non-distribution constraint, the first donation from a “pionneer” donor is 
represented as 𝐷1. Considering this, manager have two options: finance the current 
production of 𝑄1 or retain partially it to finance future production (𝑄2), as F represents 
the total savings from period 1.  Mention that the entrepreuner cannot produce more than 
the total donation received in period 1 (Equation 1.3). Well, in period 2, donations can be 
higher 𝐷2𝐻 or lower 𝐷2𝐿 with same probability.The manager will have more incentive to 
save and to carry out forward endowment, as the spread between 𝐷2𝐿 and 𝐷2𝐻 (𝑄2𝐿 and 
𝑄2𝐻) increases, and so to produce less in period 1 in order to finance partially the output 
of period 2. Equation (1.4) is the optimal utility choice that the manager faces for both 
periods, being 𝜇1 the Lagrange multiplier for equation (1.3). 
Over the use of producing the charitable good, the manager can use the savings for other 
purposes that the output of the good. This diversion will be represented by (1 − 𝑠)𝐹. ∅ 
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represents the level of the organization to ensure monitorization over manager’s actions 
so its fully represented by (s-∅/2𝑠2)F.  The entrepreneur problem is now: 
max
𝑠
𝑈 (𝐷1 − 𝐹) + 1/2[𝑈((1 − 𝑠)𝐹 + 𝐷2𝐿) + [𝑈((1 − 𝑠)𝐹 + 𝐷2𝐻)] +(s-∅/2𝑠
2)F   
(1.5) 
Where, 
𝑄2𝑖 = 𝐷1 − 𝑄1 + 𝐷2𝑖 = (1 − 𝑠)𝐹 + 𝐷2𝑖 , 𝑖 = 𝐿, 𝐻 
𝑄1 ≤ 𝐷1 
S yields 
−1/2[𝑈′[((1 − 𝑠)𝐹 + 𝐷2𝐿) + [𝑈′((1 − 𝑠)𝐹 + 𝐷2𝐻)] +1- 𝜑𝑠 = 0 
The bigger the level of monitoring (∅) the lower diversion can the manager do of 
endowment (s). So, the model understands the possibility of the entrepreneur to divert 
funds from endowment. Fisman and Hubbard (2004) also includes the figure of the 
pioneer donor. The pioneer donor knows the possibility of endowment diversion, so it 
defines the amount of the donation to be spent right away, where the entrepreneur diverts 
part of the endowment retained. They state that even if the pioneer donor increases the 
“burn rate” of donations it decreases the possibility of smoothing future production. 
The equations presented next represent the extensions of the full model as presented in 
Fisman and Hubbard (2004). 
max
𝐷1𝐹
𝑉 (𝐷1 − 𝐹) + 1/2[𝑉((1 − 𝑠)𝐹 + 𝐷2𝐿) + 𝑉((1 − 𝑠)𝐹 + 𝐷2𝐻) + 𝑊 − 𝐷1 
𝑉′(𝐷1 − 𝐹) = 1 
−𝑉′(𝐷1 − 𝐹) + 1/2(1 − 𝑠)[𝑉
′((1 − 𝑠)𝐹 + 𝐷2𝐿) + 𝑉
′((1 − 𝑠)𝐹 + 𝐷2𝐻) = 0 
 
Although this dissertation does not focus on monitorization of the donors on their 
donations, the model gives an interesting insight in how agency problems can arise when 
managers do not use efficiently the funds received and divert them for other purposes 
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other than producing the NPO output. Full model explanation can be seen in the cited 
document (Fisman and Hubbard, 2004). 
1.5. Theoretical Framework of the Research Question 
 
Generally for-profit organizations have comparably to NPO a few more variables or 
situations that allows a further quantitative studying in the context of Agency Theory. 
Publicly traded companies are usually in the center of acquisitions and, in these cases, 
managers are over big scrutiny (Schleifer and Vishny, 1997). Monitoring and securities 
analysts can also influence agency costs in organizations (Chung and Jo, 1996). 
Consequently, variables like market value or dividend payout are usually used to assess 
possible agency costs in the for-profit world.  
Problems of agency can also be studied in function of the countries’ law and governance 
evaluation. Dittmar et al. (2003) conclude that organizations with low shareholders 
protection tend to hold more cash than those organizations in countries with higher 
shareholders protection. Dittmar and Smith (2005) and Pinkowitz (2015) show evidence 
that in presence of poor governance firms cash is valued lower that in good governance 
firms. Also, operational efficiency in cash spending is higher for good performance firms 
that for poorer. 
In Jensen (1986) it is suggested debt as a control mechanism to promote management 
efficiency. Debtholders are also residual claimants on the organization assets given that 
they have to be repaid by the principal amount plus interests on debt (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Although in slightly different conditions, debt is also an occurring 
situation in NPO, so it is present in this study.  
This dissertation began with the allusion to the non-distribution constraint. Well, 
distribution of profit by shareholders is a common possibility in the for-profit area. 
Whether managers decide to do it or not constitutes their own choice, depending if their 
interests are or are not aligned with shareholders’ interests. The case of NPO is different. 
There are not any residual claimants on the organizations profits (Hannsman, 2010). From 
the point of view of donors, they have no claims on the organization net free cash flow. 
Still there is residual risk as the organization can expropriate part of the funds donated by 
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them. In this case, NPO have similar structure comparing to for-profit corporations when 
it comes to monitor or ratify decisions (Jensen and Fama, 1983). NPO can either retain it 
or reinvest in the organization. 
Retention can occur in form of endowment or cash holdings, so these are target variables 
when it comes to uncover agency problems in common literature. When it comes to for-
profit literature, it is related normally in cases of payout for shareholders or reinvestment 
on the organization. Jensen (1986) refers that conflicts of interest between shareholders 
and managers can occur due to dividend payout policies, when the corporation generate 
substantial free cash flow. 
 In the NPO case, the motivation can be more relevant in cases of precautionary savings 
(Leland,1968). In Hansmann (1990) study, universities are more likely to hold cash to 
spend it in the future then to use it right now.   
As argument in this dissertation, liquid assets are likely to be hold due to agency factors 
or by precautionary motives. There two theories that address motivation for cash 
holdings. 
The Pecking Order Theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984) suggests a hierarchy of financing 
for organizations. Internal financing (e.g. cash) followed by debt issues and finally equity. 
The authors arrange this classification as bigger the cost of information for external 
funders increases. Although NPO cannot issue equity, they can still can get debt so the 
theory still adjusts. 
On the other hand, the trade-off model states that the optimal level of cash holdings should 
be so that the marginal benefits of holding it, equals its marginal costs (Frank and Goyal, 
2007). 
Opler et al. (1999) states that there are two primary reasons for liquid assets holding. 
Financing current operations, when there are no other sources available or there too 
expensive. Second, the necessity of selling assets for financing purposes is nonexistent. 
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1.6. Critical Review of the main literature 
 
The first four studies in table (3) are linked to the research question, so they are presented 
in the next chapter. All quantitative studies used sample of USA located NPO4, whose 
data can be obtained in the IRS 990 form that must be filed by third sector organizations 
in the USA. Study on CEO compensation by Gaver and Im (2013) concludes that higher 
excess compensation is associated with NPO that rely more in investment income. Also, 
higher compensation is related with NPO with proportionally higher income from grants 
and public donations. Hewitt and Brown (2000) on their research on environmental NPO 
say that managers do not get positive utility only on providing services. 
In the qualitative side, the study of Viader and Espina (2013) could find in its majority, 
of organizations in Puerto Rico, manifestations of Agency Theory and then followed by 
Stewardship and Resource Dependency Theory in lower proportions. The other empirical 
ones concluded a mix of the quoted theories to perceive better how the managers behave 
in NPO. Mention to Van Puyvelde researches on this theme, perceiving also signals of 
agency problems but also evidence of Stewardship and Stakeholder Theory. 
Table 3. Empirical studies made over the subject 
 
Theories Variables in Study Authors 
 
   
  Fisman and Hubbard (2003) 
Agency Theory Endowment Fisman and Hubbard (2004) 
Quantitative 
  Core et al. (2006) 
    
 Agency Theory Cash Holdings Ramirez (2010) 
    
 
 
Cultural and Bonus Schemes 
Quality and Reputation Work 
Pressure and Organization 
Kluvers and Tippett (2011) 
 Stewardship Theory Puyvelde et al. (2016) 
Qualitative 
Agency Theory Caers et al. (2007) 
 
 Slyke et al. (2006) 
   
Agency Theory Board Structure Viader and Espina (2014) 
Stakeholder Theory Business Ethics Bouckaert and Vandenhove (1998) 
                                                          
4 Given that the studies used USA located NPO, the information is storage in the National Center of 
Charitable Statistics (NCCS) website. 
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Most of the authors visualize the remaining theories as limiting and not opposing to the 
Agency Theory, given that it makes strict assumptions about the behavior of the parties 
involved and it was originally designed in the context of for-profit organizations. It is 
only plausible then to think that managers can behave and act in a different manner when 
the maximum objective of the organization is social value and not an economic one. Still, 
it does not mean that a NPO do not present the assumptions of Agency Theory. 
The studies of Agency Theory on NPO have introduced important extensions to the 
theory in a way that gave new perspectives for developing it further. The fact is, being 
the base of the studies the NPO, it showed managerial characteristics different from we 
are regularly presented. Proof of Stewardship Theory and considering an important role 
on stakeholders, with exception for shareholders and even debtholders, these articles 
provided interesting insights for different actions on the relation between principals and 
agents. 
 
Table 4. Methodological aspects of similar studies 
Data 
Collection 
Authors Country of 
Study 
Sample 
Size 
Sector Variable of 
Study 
Key 
Informants 
Unit of Analysis Statistical 
Analysis 
Database Core et al. (2006) United 
States 
41752 Multiple Endowment Board Organization/
CEO 
Regression 
Database Fisman and 
Hubbard (2003) 
United 
States 
4546 Multiple Endowment Board Organization/
CEO 
Regression 
Database Fisman and 
Hubbard (2004) 
United 
States 
4787 Multiple Endowment Board Organization/
CEO 
Regression 
Database Ramirez (2010) United 
States 
97779 Multiple Cash 
Holdings 
Board Organization/
CEO 
Regression 
 
This dissertation’s methodology was inspired in the first and forth study presented in the 
table (4). Both uses benchmark regression to define the NPO with excess cash or 
endowment relatively to the whole sample. The difference between cash holdings and 
endowment is on the liquidity of the assets analyzed. Ramirez (2010) argues that 
independently of how public securities are, NPO reported net losses in revenue by the 
time they sold them.5 Also, he shows that cash and endowment are distributed the same 
                                                          
5 The evolution of cash and endowment for the NPO used in the sample (2013-2015) can be viewed in the 
table (4) and (5) in the Appendices. 
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way when observing NPO industry by industry. However, endowment is the most used 
variable for asset analysis and to explain precautionary savings in NPO operations. 
Nevertheless, the independent variables to explain the behavior of either cash or 
endowment are pretty much the same.  
Core et al. (2006)6 found evidence of agency problems when looking for excess 
endowment regarding board compensation. In the study, excess endowment (divided into 
persistent and transitory) is used to test three main hypothesis: growth opportunities, 
where it was not found any relation between persistent excess endowment and investment 
or program expenditures; monitoring, concluding that program expenditures are lower for 
NPO with excess endowment; finally, agency problems where, like was told initially, 
there is evidence, more precisely in the positive relation between management/officer 
compensation and excess endowment. 
Ramirez (2010)7 instead uses excess cash and although he does not exclude agency 
problems, he does not consider them a major issue. The Precautionary Savings Theory is 
supported by the results on cash holdings when testing for control variables. Higher 
revenue concentration causes to lower cash holdings. Higher officer compensation tends 
to represent lower cash holdings and higher board numbers tends to reflect in higher cash 
holdings. In the case of excess cash holdings, officer compensation is negatively 
correlated. NPO with higher cash holdings tend to invest more in their assets and donors 
seem to have preference for NPO that retain more cash. 
Fisman and Hubbard (2003) on studying endowment intensity, have data that support the 
precautionary savings on endowment for NPO. Donors are willingly to provide more 
donations to NPO located in states with better oversight8. 
Fisman and Hubbard (2004) in their sensitivity study conclude that poor governance 
states compared with strong governance states: managerial compensation is more highly 
correlated with inflows of donations; allocate a smaller percentage of donations in the 
endowment for future expenditures. 
                                                          
6 The explanatory power of the model for the benchmark regression is of 26.61%. 
7 The explanatory power of the model for the benchmark regression is of 23.16%. 
8 “Measured by the numbers of powers accorded to the state attorney general in monitoring and punishing 
nonprofits.” 
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1.7. Hypotheses Formulation 
 
NPO with excess endowment face limited options in how they can use it. Core et al. 
(2006) state those options in how managers can disgorge it. So, managers can: 
• Still retaining the excess endowment; 
• Do investment in fixed assets; 
• Increase program expenditures; 
• Use to their private benefit, in form of compensation or perquisites. 
So, one of the hypotheses follows the fourth point logic that is easier for managers to 
consume assets for personal interests from endowment funds rather streams of revenue 
(Core et al.,2006) and (Fisman and Hubbard, 2002). 
H1: Compensation is unrelated to NPO excess endowment, ceteris paribus. 
The other hypotheses, follows Ramirez (2010) regarding excess cash holdings relative to 
investment in assets and grants. If donors care about excess endowment holdings, they 
would reduce the amount of donations made. Regarding investment in assets, good 
management actions would use the endowment retained towards the organization and not 
for personal purposes. 
H2: Grants receives are unrelated to NPO excess endowment, ceteris paribus. 
H3: Investment in fixed assets (PPE) is unrelated to NPO excess endowment, 
ceteris paribus. 
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Chapter 2. Empirical Analysis 
 
For this chapter, data used in sample and respective econometric model are presented. 
Each main financial indicator is explained, and the results got from the application of the 
regression are shown. 
2.1 Data 
 
Data gathered to compute the sample was taken from public reports of the Portuguese 
NPO available in their websites. Initially, the sample consisted of 49 NPO (with 
recognizable legal form)9 for the period of 2013-2015. From those remained 23 NPO (69 
observations) for the period considered. Deleted observations consisted from those who 
did not disclose information for the 5 years10 (namely financial reports), unclarity 
regarding tax exempt status or not enough information to compute specific variables. In 
Portugal, there are various types of legal form that the NPO can assume. The sample 
consists only of Associations and Foundations.  In the table 4, it is presented the 
Descriptive Statistics. 
2.2 Methodology 
 
The equation (2.1) represents the model for the benchmark regression, where i represents 
the NPO observed and the t is the year.  
Eit = ait + β1 ∗ StdRevit + β2 ∗ Laborit + β3 ∗ Nincomeit + β4 ∗ Debtit +  𝛽5 ∗
  𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + β6 ∗ RevConcit + β7 ∗ Compit + β8 ∗ Boardit + eit                 (2.1) 
 
• E is total endowment, being constituted by cash-non interest bearing, savings and 
temporary cash investment and investment securities;  
• StdRev represents the standard deviation of total revenue; 
•  Labor is all expenses related with personnel costs; 
                                                          
9 Reference for a list of ONG gathered by Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian. For the sample considered, it 
was also given priority for NPO linked to A3S. 
10 For the computation of the standard deviation of revenue, it was considered a period of 3 years (2011-
2015). The rest of the variables only needed information for the period 2013-2015. 
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•  Nincome is net income;  
• Debt represents the total amount of debt of the NPO;  
• RevConc is the Herfhindal Index for revenue concentration and is calculated as 
presented next, 
𝑯𝒊𝒕 = 𝚺𝒊=𝟏
𝑵 𝒔𝒊𝒕
𝟐                                                    (2.2) 
- where s stands for each sub-indicator of revenue (grants, sales, …); 
• Comp is board remuneration and is a binary variable that assumes value “1” if the 
NPO remunerates its board and “0” if otherwise;  
• Board is total members of the board of directors. 
The elaboration of the variables was based on the financial sheets of each NPO.  
The endowment is then formed by cash and bank deposits plus financial investments and 
other similar. This is the dependent variable in our model. 
StdvRev is a proxy for measuring uncertainty in revenue. Coefficient of variation of 
revenue could also be used (Core et al. 2006). It is expected that with an increase in 
uncertainty of income, the need for precautionary savings is higher. A positive coefficient 
is expected between endowment and this variable. 
Labor represents all personnel costs. Fisman and Hubbard (2003) uses this variable as 
measure of labor intensity and the need to use other variables to suppress possible 
financial shocks other than endowment. It is expected a negative coefficient. 
Net Income is all gains discounted of all expenses. This represents an important measure 
on the direction it takes regarding the non-distribution constraint, if we are in the presence 
of surpluses. It can be considered the following main hypotheses in here: in case of 
entrenchment, managers will likely hold the surpluses to avoid bank oversight and to 
derive private benefits (Ramirez, 2010); in Harford et al. (2008) managers can spend it 
quickly in order to avoid monitoring costs of accumulating it. 
Debt if the NPO incur in obtained financing. Debt can act as management constraint 
simply because managers should have financial discipline, so the endowment is bounded 
to the fact the NPO has or has not any debt. Fisman and Hubbard (2003) looks for the 
Stakeholder Theory vs Agency Theory in Portuguese NPO – an Endowment Approach 
 
23 
 
debt as an alternative measure of financing other than endowment. Following Core et al. 
(2006) prediction, NPO with debt financing are likely to hold less endowment that those 
who do not. 
Expenses is an indicator that act as a proxy to measure organization’s dimension. In the 
literature, it is expected that bigger the organization’s dimension, the less will be the need 
to constitute endowment. 
Revenue Concentration is a weight measure for revenue diversification. Following 
Ramirez (2010) reasoning, the coefficient signal is empirically unknown. He argues that 
a higher level of income diversification could devalue the importance of sources of 
revenue like donations or grants. By consequence, less monitoring may occur which may 
lead to more savings. Nonetheless, income diversification may also reduce the need of 
cash holding as a hedging tool (given that is costly to hold), so the signal can be negative 
as stated in the same paper. 
Managers with less monitoring are more likely to expropriate from endowment to meet 
their personal interests than from simple revenue streams (Fisman and Hubbard, 2003, in 
Core et al.,2006). It is expected a positive signal. 
Miller (2002) says that larger boards will likely force managers to lower their endowment 
holdings. Organizational efficiency is empirically observed as positive correlated with 
the presence of major donors in board (Callen et al., 2003 in Ramirez, 2010). The 
predicted sign for the quoted literature is positive. Nonetheless, it can assume a negative 
sign if the board do not enforce proper monitoring. 
After the benchmark regression, it will be used its residuals as explained variables and 
explanatory variables. The regressions are presented next:  
𝑬𝒙 𝑬𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒕 = 𝜶𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟏 ∗ 𝑳𝒂𝒈𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐 ∗ 𝑹𝒆𝒗𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒄𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑 ∗ 𝑫𝒆𝒃𝒕𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟒 ∗ 𝑪𝒐𝒎𝒑𝒊𝒕 +
𝜷𝟓 ∗ 𝑷𝑷𝑬𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟔𝑩𝒐𝒂𝒓𝒅𝒊𝒕 + 𝒆𝒊𝒕                                      (2.3) 
𝑮𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒔𝒊𝒕 = 𝜶𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟏 ∗ 𝑳𝒂𝒈𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐 ∗ 𝑹𝒆𝒗𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒄𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑 ∗ 𝑫𝒆𝒃𝒕𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟒 ∗ 𝑪𝒐𝒎𝒑𝒊𝒕 +
𝜷𝟓 ∗ 𝑷𝑷𝑬𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟔𝑩𝒐𝒂𝒓𝒅𝒊𝒕 + 𝒆𝒊𝒕                                      (2.4) 
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Where: 
• Ex End is the excess endowment obtained from the residuals of regression (2.1); 
• Lag is the lagged variable for excess endowment11; 
• Grants received in equation (2.4), represents all donations and similar obtained by 
NPO; 
• PPE is the variations on the value of fixed tangible assets from the year t-1 to year 
t. 
The remaining variables were already presented in regression (2.1). 
 
                                                          
11 As said in Ramirez (2010), donators can only make their decisions with information of the previous year 
and not the current. 
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2.3 Descriptive Statistics 
 
The descriptive statistics over the sample were made the perspective of their legal form12, 
structural organization that a NPO may assume in Portugal following country’s law. 
The data considered is about 115 total observations, 40 is data on Associations and the 
remaining 75 on Foundations. Foundations is the type of NPO with higher values in the 
first three indicators. Being said that, this type has a higher financial dimension when 
compared to Associations. Regarding PPE, both types have similar pattern, since both 
sub-samples have 0 as median. This means that they are NPO with none fixed tangible 
assets. Also, there are observations whose NPO divested in their assets and others who 
invested on their assets.  
The prominence of NPO who remunerate their boards is low when compared to the whole 
sample (3 out of 23). Also, only Foundations have their boards remunerated. 
NPO with acquired debt in any year of the 5-year period is higher but still low (6 out of 
23). From those 6, 2 are Associations and 4 are Foundations. 
In tables 2 and 3 of Appendices, it is shown the correlation matrix for the variables used 
in the regression. This allows to check for any possibility of multicollinearity between 
explanatory variables. Any value above 0.8 may induce the possibility of 
multicollinearity as the variables would be highly correlated. As observed, with exception 
for the correlation between the variables “total expenses” and “labor costs”, no other 
variable surpasses the reference value.       
 
2.4 Interpretation of Results  
 
The results for the benchmark endowment regression are presented in table 5. The period 
in analysis is from 2013 to 2015. This will not only allow to obtain the residuals for the 
                                                          
12 Information regarding NPO legal form is described in appendices in table 7 
Stakeholder Theory vs Agency Theory in Portuguese NPO – an Endowment Approach 
 
26 
 
second regression but also to perceive what independent variables affect the behavior of 
endowment retention in Portuguese NPO. 
Following the Precautionary Savings Theory, the standard deviation of revenue has the 
predicted sign. Organizations with more income uncertainty, will likely retain more 
endowment in order to face cash inflow shortage in the future. The sign is then positive. 
Labor has a negative sign given that an increase in personnel costs is followed by an 
increase in endowment. The premise for the non-distribution constraint is that NPO do 
not distribute money by shareholders (they do not have them) so they can either retain it 
in form of endowment or reinvest in the organization. In case of surpluses it is supposed 
that the endowment increases. Net Income has then a positive sign. Leveraged NPO hold 
more endowment that those who have not any kind of debt. This is consistent with risk 
aversion and by consequence managers will likely retain more endowment in order to 
repay the debt. Expenses is a proxy for organizations size. As bigger the organizations it 
is likelier that will have lesser need to retain endowment. The sign is negative, and it is 
correspondent what was predicted. Revenue Concentration shows that NPO have lesser 
need to hold for endowment when the sources of revenue increases. This is consistent 
with the hypothesis that higher different streams of revenue may induce lower levels of 
monitoring and by consequence lower endowment. Compensation sign is positive which 
may show potential signs of agency costs. NPO who remunerate their boards and maintain 
higher levels of endowment can reflect inefficient management. It is a possibility that the 
higher the board numbers, managers will be more interventive and maintain lower levels 
of endowment. The sign did not result in the predicted way. It may be the case that these 
boards are risk averse. 
The Durbin Watson statistic is a reference value for measuring regression autocorrelation. 
A value of 2 means that there is not any sign of autocorrelation. Values closer to 4 show 
that can exist the possibility of negative autocorrelation and closer to 0 shows the 
possibility of positive autocorrelation. The values shown in table 5 may indicate the 
possibility of positive autocorrelation. The f test shows that the regression is globally 
significant.
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Table 5. Benchmark regression of total endowment. For the regression of this model it was used a LS estimation with White robust errors. Numbers 
in parentheses are the t-values for the estimates. The *, ** and *** stands respectively for 10%, 5% and 1% significance level. The dependent variable is 
Total Endowment divided by total expenses. Endowment is constituted by cash, savings and temporary cash investment and investment securities. The 
variable Stdev Revenue is the standard deviation of revenue and it was calculated for the 3 years prior to each year in the period considered of total 
revenue. Labor represents all costs with labor and its calculated by dividing personnel costs by total expenses. Net Income is the division between net 
income and total expenses. Debt represents obtained funding and its calculated by dividing by total expenses. The variable Expenses is natural logarithm 
of total expenses. Revenue Concentration is the Herfindhal Index of total revenue. Compensation is a dummy variable that assumes value ”1” if the NPO 
remunerates its administration board and “0” if otherwise. Board represents the number of elements that constitutes the administration board.  
Variable   1 2 3 4 
Intercept   
0.437 2.439** 0.332 2.833*** 
(0.466) (2.587) (0.354) (3.936) 
Stdev Revenue   
6.08E-08* 6.43E-08** 6.84E-08** 7.65E-08** 
(1.851) (2.003) (2.028) (2.366) 
Labor   
0.505*** -0.18*** -0.12*** -1.23*** 
(8.48) (-3.563) (-2.563) (-6.225) 
Net Income   
1.788*** 1.766** 1.629*** 1.544*** 
(5.391) (7.35) (4.578) (4.918) 
Debt   
1.249*** 1.286*** 1.309*** 1.383*** 
(4.127) (4.473) (4.137) (4.516) 
Expenses   
0.018 -0.032 -0.012 -0.090* 
(0.274) (-0.522) (-0.183) (1.74) 
Revenue Concentration     
-1.688*** 
  
-2.071*** 
(-12.539) (12.52) 
Compensation     
0.418*** 
  
0.635*** 
(5.351) (5.678) 
Board       
0.116*** 0.159*** 
(7.907) (8.145) 
R2  0.49 0.53 0.52 0.59 
Adjusted R2   0.45 0.48 0.48 0.53 
N   69 69 69 69 
DW  0.662 0.708 0.696 0.803 
F  12.285*** 10.02*** 11.351*** 10.651*** 
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Using the benchmark regression model, it follows the analysis of excess endowment and 
grants as dependent variables. Residuals of the previous regression will allow to 
understand if NPO who maintain high levels of endowment result of agency factors or 
not. Also, the analysis of the dependent variable grants will show what are the main 
factors that influence donors at the time they make their donations. 
Results of the regression are presented in table 6. Excess Endowment dependent variable 
model is not explained by observed variable. Lagged variable is statistically significant 
and positive which means that excess endowment is persistent over time. Variations in 
investment of fixed tangible assets are statistically significant, what shows that managers 
reinvest the endowment onto the organization, having the opportunities to grow. This can 
prove that managers are efficient and do not show patterns of agency problems. The null 
hypothesis for H3 can be then rejected. However, compensation variable is not 
statistically significant which means that cannot explain the behavior of excess 
endowment. The null hypothesis for H1 cannot be rejected. 
Grants receives are explained by the model. Lag signal is positive. Although the variable 
is significant, it shows that donators increase donations when endowment increases. If 
agency problems existed, the signal would be negative instead of positive, given that 
donators would reduce the amount of donations attributed in situations of endowment 
increase, which it is not the case. The null hypothesis for H2 can be rejected and agency 
problems excluded. 
The results obtained are not distant from the results that Ramirez (2010) met on its 
research. Coincident variables on both model were statistically significant for grants 
behavior with an exception for compensation (on this regression was significant, on 
Ramirez (2010) it was not) and excess endowment lagged variable.  
The Durbin Watson statistic for excess endowment is 2.967 which show signs of negative 
autocorrelation. The regression is globally significant. 
The Durbin-Watson statistic for grants is 1.2967 which show signs of positive 
autocorrelation. The regression is globally significant.  
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Table 6.. Regression for excess endowment and grants. For the regression of this model it was used a LS estimation with White robust errors. Numbers 
in parentheses are the t-values for the estimates. The *,** and *** stands respectively for 10%, 5% and 1% significance level. The dependent variable for 
the first column is the residuals of the benchmark regression, represented as the excess endowment of NPO. The dependent variable in the second column 
is total grants, calculated as ratio of grants to total expenses. Endowment is constituted by cash, savings and temporary cash investment and investment 
securities. Lag is the lagged value of excess endowment. Revenue Concentration is the Herfindhal Index of total revenue. Access to Debt is a dummy 
variable that assumes value “1” if the NPO had any kind of Debt, “0” if otherwise. Compensation is a dummy variable that assumes value ”1” if the NPO 
remunerates its administration board and “0” if otherwise. PPE represents the investment in fixed assets, and its values are the variation in fixed assets on 
NPO from the year t-1 to year t. Board represents the number of elements that constitutes the administration board.  
Variable   Excess endowment Grants 
Intercept   
-0.012 -0.201 
(-0.051) (-1.345) 
Lag    
0.632*** 0.045*** 
(3.096) (17.771) 
Revenue Concentration   
-0.32 -0.995*** 
(-13.29) (8.781) 
Access to Debt   
-0.231* -0.066*** 
(-1.755) (-3.370) 
Compensation   
-0.024 0.348** 
(-0.108) (2.321) 
PPE   
-5.68E-08*** -1.60E-08*** 
(-4.957) (6.935) 
Board   
0.032 0.037*** 
(0.819) (2.898) 
R2  0.50 0.46 
Adjusted R2   0.42 0.37 
N   46 46 
DW  2.967 1.297 
F  6.51*** 5.494*** 
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Conclusion 
 
The objective of this dissertation was to check for any preposition of Agency Theory 
and/or Stakeholder Theory in Portuguese NPO. Influenced by the curricular internship 
over the second of my master’s in A3S, I gain curiosity on understanding more the 
differences between this sector and the for-profit sector. The literature on this matter is 
scarce, so it reinforced my expectations on conducting this type of study.  
Understandably, the structure between them are different but not entirely different from 
each other. Board of directors exists in NPO which assure the function of monitoring over 
the manager actions. Principal as stated in the for-profit organizations may not exist but 
put under the correct framework allows to perceive principal-agent’s relationships onto 
third sector organizations. Stakeholder Theory played an important role given that assured 
an appropriate analysis between donators and NPO. Agent is commonly the manager 
despite the type of organizations we are analyzing. So, these are some way or another 
assured. Manager’s self-interest is what it matters to be analyzed. 
First, we run a benchmark regression to observe which financial indicators influenced the 
behavior of endowment. Endowment is influenced in its majority by variables as 
theoretically defined in common literature. More uncertainty in revenue will mean higher 
endowment for NPO. Increases in labor expenses will make endowment lower. More 
retention of endowment will be consequence of higher net income. Indebted NPO will 
have more reasons to retain endowment. Organizations with relatively more expenses 
have comparably lower endowment. Different revenue streams will cause less monitoring 
and by consequence lesser endowment. NPO with remunerated boards, will have more 
reasons to retain endowment. Finally, larger boards have a positive sign with endowment. 
Secondly, another regression using residuals of the first regression as a dependent 
variable and also as a dependent lagged variable (excess endowment). Grants is also used 
as a dependent variable. 
The variable compensation is not able to explain excess endowment. Consequently, we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis for H1. For this variable, we can forgo the possibility of 
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agency costs given that board remuneration maybe considered to be used in manager’s 
self-interest.  
Grants receives are explained by the lagged variable of excess endowment but has a 
positive signal. At the time of making their donations, donors give attention if the NPO 
are retaining or not excess endowment, but they do not reduce the amount donated if 
endowment increases. We can reject the null hypothesis for H2 and the possibility of 
agency problems. 
The variable PPE is statistically significant in the model of excess endowment which 
means that we can reject the null hypothesis for H3. 
The results on this dissertation do exclude agency factors for the behavior of managers in 
NPO. Also, it brings empirical evidence on the behavior of endowment holdings on NPO 
and some argument to search for other theories. 
Limitations 
On conducting this research, I search for the financial statements as obliged in the 
Portuguese accountability standards. However, when comparing to the USA studies I 
found some limitations: 
• Lack of the financial indicator Program Expenses, one of the common indicators 
over NPO literature to assess these topics; 
• Reduced sample, consequence of undisclosable or incomplete financial reports. 
Beyond the referred limitations, comparisons between studies would allowed a better 
description of the realities between countries. 
Future Research 
Future studies should allow the use of qualitative studies pairing with quantitative studies. 
As NPO tend to value their qualitative part, a more complete model should also integrate 
qualitative variables, to assess for other theories like Stewardship Theory. Comparison 
between different legal form, in a sensitivity analysis would also be important as they 
have different revenue sources and different structures in some cases. Finally, quantitative 
studies in different EU countries would also provide interesting insights. 
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Appendices 
 
1. Sample of NPO considered for analysis (distributed by legal form) 
Associations Foundations 
Associação A3S ADFP 
ACEP AMI 
Acreditar Benfica 
AETP Champagnat 
Oikos Champalimaud 
Plataforma ONGD Cidade de Lisboa 
Rosto Solidário D.Luís 
Tese EDP 
 Eugénio de Almeida 
Fê e Cooperação 
Manuel dos Santos 
Montepio 
Portuguesa de Cardiologia 
Pão de Açucar 
Serralves 
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2. Pearson correlation matrix 
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ENDOWMENT_EXP  1.000000         
 -----          
          
STDEV_REVENUE  0.537263 1.000000        
 5.214139 -----         
          
LBR  -0.150326 -0.345192 1.000000       
 -1.244611 -3.010567 -----        
          
NINCOME  0.372562 0.091209 0.031360 1.000000      
 3.286129 0.749699 0.256818 -----       
          
OBTAINED_DEBT  0.567486 0.483251 -0.253128 0.161862 1.000000     
 5.641444 4.518173 -2.141695 1.342599 -----      
          
EXPENSES 0.4217 0.2149 0.821819 0.661646 0.321199 1.000000    
 3.806803 1.801113 0.025877 0.17817 0.77512 ----    
          
REVENUE_CONCENTATION  -0.164669 0.043066 -0.283788 -0.055271 0.049899 -0.043817 1.000000   
 -1.366531 0.352837 -2.422505 -0.453107 0.408950 -0.359 -----    
          
COMPENSATION  0.010587 -0.091040 0.043811 0.032260 -0.075397 -0.66257 0.200726 1.000000  
 0.086665 -0.748299 0.358950 0.264199 -0.618914 -7.24081 1.677148 -----   
          
BOARD  0.039439 -0.283239 0.403378 0.140573 -0.206951 -0.26052 -0.020036 -0.089548 1.000000 
 0.323072 -2.417408 3.608385 1.162176 -1.731453 -2.20872 -0.164031 -0.735935 -----  
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3. Spearman correlation matrix 
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ENDOWMENT_EXP  1.000000         
 -----          
          
STDEV_REVENUE  0.158677 1.000000        
 1.315497 -----         
          
LBR  -0.100332 -0.409770 1.000000       
 -0.825422 -3.676995 -----        
          
NINCOME  0.299269 0.441871 -0.046951 1.000000      
 2.567287 4.031828 -0.384734 -----       
          
OBTAINED_DEBT  -0.056712 0.534225 -0.480888 0.208202 1.000000     
 -0.464958 5.172839 -4.489410 1.742393 -----      
          
EXPENSES 0.216989 -0.253087 0.891911 0.6617 0.3212 1.000000    
 1.819482 -2.14132 16.14425 7.223892 2.776245 -----    
          
REVENUE_CONCENTATION  -0.196967 0.003252 -0.326976 -0.214541 0.238128 0.0428 1.000000   
 -1.644463 0.026617 -2.832084 -1.797963 2.006896 0.350654 -----    
          
COMPENSATION  0.186222 0.170863 0.061436 -0.094071 -0.008884 -0.0626 0.155505 1.000000  
 1.551430 1.419451 0.503829 -0.773433 -0.072722 -0.51341 1.288537 -----   
          
BOARD  0.168139 -0.249624 0.395211 -0.029515 -0.276909 -0.2605 -0.060530 -0.105143 1.000000 
 1.396156 -2.110061 3.521638 -0.241693 -2.358841 -2.20854 -0.496371 -0.865429 -----  
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4. Types of NPO in Portugal 
 ICNPO Group Type of Organizations in 
Portugal Ner Designation 
1 Cultural and recreation Sport, cultural and 
recreational associations 
“Casas do Povo” 
Recreational and social clubs 
Museums 
Zoo and aquariums 
Historical and literary 
societies 
Theater and dancing 
associations 
Juvenile or students 
associations 
2 Education and research Religious schools 
Catholic universities 
Investigation centers 
3 Health Hospitals and health centers 
4 Social services “Instituições Particulares de 
Solidariedade Social”-IPSS 
“Santa Casa da Misericórdia” 
Social solidarity cooperatives 
Mutualities 
Firefighters associations 
5 Environment Non governamental 
environmental associations 
Animals protection 
associations 
6 Development and housing Local development 
organizations 
Housing and construction 
associations 
Residents associations 
7 Law, advocacy and policies Human-rights associations 
Political parties 
Residents associations 
8 Philanthropic intermediaries 
and voluntarism promotion 
Grant-giving or donors 
Volunteers promoters 
“Bancos alimentares” 
9 International ONGD 
International organization 
subsidiaries 
10 Religious Religious institutions 
Religious associations 
11 Business and professional 
associations, unions 
Business associations 
Professional associations 
Unions  
12 Nec  
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5. Evolution of endowment and cash (2013-2015) 
 
 
 
6. Cash and endowment structure (2013-2015) 
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7. Descriptive Statistics 
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 Legal Form                   
Associations 24 119.69 629.86 641.02 219.92 4.92 - 0 2 
Foundations 45 1 329.744 2 419.61  2 216.71  949.31 57.47  - 3 4 
          
Full Sample 115                 
Median   632.00  1 554.52 1 491.30  421.06 16.81 - - - 
Standard Deviation   108 001.71  29 784.05  27 604.00 1 812.22 3 152.65 7 525.41 - - 
Mean   27 218.68  9 901.24  8 907.80 1 267.43  993.44  -16480,34 - - 
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8. Legal form and legal statuses Portuguese NPO 
Legal Form Legal Status 
Associations IPSS 
Cooperatives ONGD 
Foundations  
Houses of Mercy  
Mutualities  
 
